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Article 8

UPSTREAM FINANCING AND USE OF THE
CORPORATE GUARANTY
I. Introduction
A. Upstream Financing
Upstream financing is a useful tool for affiliated corporations seeking to
make the most efficient use of combined resources. Essentially, "upstream"
financing occurs when a subsidiary corporation loans its parent money or guarantees its parent's obligations. It is to be distinguished from cross-stream (subsidiary to subsidiary) or downstream (parent to subsidiary) financing, and from
financing between brother-sister' corporations, although these transactions are
analogous.
Affiliated corporations use upstream financing when the parent needs extra
capital, either for current operations or for a new venture, and cannot otherwise
obtain the financing due to past restrictions on debt or insufficient collateral. For
example, a situation might arise involving a business opportunity that is best
suited for the parent. Although a financing institution might not be willing to
finance the parent on the strength of its credit alone, the subsidiary's guaranty
may provide the protection which the bank needs. In this way the parent can
benefit from the opportunity which otherwise would have been lost, and the
corporate group as a whole also benefits.
Upstream financing can be accomplished by the use of loans or by the use
of a guaranty.2 Various considerations influence the choice between these
alternatives. If the subsidiary's assets are cash, cash equivalents, or assets that can
easily be turned into cash, a loan may be appropriate. The availability of outside
capital is a major consideration, involving not only the question of whether the
corporation can obtain access to the capital, but also whether interest rates and
other terms are more favorable than those which the subsidiary can offer.
Restrictions on the use of the subsidiary's funds may also greatly influence the
choice of financing. For example, restrictions which may be determinative are
those which creditors or preferred stockholders have placed on the subsidiary,
limiting its ability to issue new bonds, execute loans, or mortgage assets. If
these types of restrictions are present, a loan may be impossible; depending on
the restriction, however, a guaranty may be a feasible alternative.
The law regulating upstream loans is less complex than that concerning
the use of guaranties,3 and this relative simplicity might be determinative. In the
many circumstances in which a loan is not practical, however, the corporate
guaranty can be extremely valuable for financing existing ventures, promoting
expansion, and establishing new enterprises.' This note will therefore focus on
the use of the corporate guaranty for upstream financing.
1 Brother-sister corporations are two separate entities which are related only by the fact
that a common stockholder owns over 50% of the stock of each corporation.
2 A guaranty is a promise to pay in the event that the principal defaults. See text accompanying note 8 infra.
3 See text accompanying note 8 infli.
4 Witt, Corporate Guaranties:The Quest for Legislative Clarification, 36 TEx. B. J. 907,
914 (1973).
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B. Problems Involved
If an upstream guaranty is utilized and the venture is a success, problems
generally do not arise. Rather, it is when the venture fails and enforcement of the
guaranty is sought that its validity is questioned. The ensuing lawsuit generally
is a result of the corporation's failure to honor the guaranty, often due to a lack
of funds or bankruptcy. The institution that accepted the guaranty sues the
corporation and the defense of ultra vires5 is invoked by the corporation. Another
situation in which a lawsuit may result from the guaranty involves attempted
payment of the guaranty by the corporation. At this time, stockholders or intra
vires6 creditors may sue the corporation to enjoin payment, claiming that payment would be ultra vires.
The underlying basis of such challenges is the fact that the corporations
involved in upstream financing are legally separate entities which are assumed to
exist to further their own separate interests, not those of related companies.
Therefore, the courts often insist that the subsidiary benefit from a guaranty to
prevent a finding that the, guaranty is a misuse of the subsidiary's assets and
hence unenforceable.
Although tangible benefit to the subsidiary may not occur, affiliated corporations are often operated in such a way that when one of the corporations benefits, the others also benefit, at least indirectly. Therefore, at the outset, when
attempting to procure financing, affiliated corporations present themselves as an
economic unit which desires to employ the subsidiary's assets for the benefit of
the parent. The corporations argue that they actually are an integrated economic
unit; if the parent is benefited, so is the group.
When such ventures fail and the parties confront each other in court, however, corporations often attempt to avoid legal responsibilities by arguing that
they are legally separate entities and that the subsidiary did not benefit from the
venture. Therefore, the guaranty was ultra vires and is unenforceable by the
creditors. These contradictory arguments framed by corporate counsel for tactical
reasons in the course of litigation have contributed to a lack of uniformity in case
law.
The fact that corporate guaranty problems do not arise in isolation poses yet
another obstacle to a clear understanding of the law in the area. Questions concerning corporate guaranties are usually presented in the midst of various other
corporate problems, arising long after execution of the guaranty. For example,
the guaranty issue is often raised in bankruptcy proceedings, or in litigation concerning alleged abuse of the corporate system.
Contributing further to judicial difficulty in the matter is the fact that
subsidiary-parent guaranties involve a mixture of corporate guaranty law and
fiduciary duty law. These two areas are directly applicable to upstream financing,.yet the extent to which any given court will rely on each approach is unclear.
Moreover, courts seldom segregate the issues involved, which increases the
difficulty of ascertaining the appropriate test to be used in evaluating the
5 An ultra vires act is an act which is beyond the scope of the powers of a corporate
charter or act of incorporation.
6 Intra vires means within the scope of corporate powers.
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validity of the guaranty. In addition, the obscurity of the common law in each
of these two areas makes it even more difficult to find a suitable test for upstream
guaranties.
Despite these problems, there are certain tests which courts frequently apply
to determine the validity of an upstream guaranty. One such test is the benefit
test.' As previously noted, courts often require a benefit to the guarantor corporation so that the transaction ostensibly fulfills a corporate purpose of the guarantor and is therefore not ultra vires. The concept of "benefit" cannot, however,
be defined precisely. For example, securing a future sale might constitute a
benefit. Consummating a transaction which will improve a corporation's public
image might also be said to benefit that company. Since the concept of benefit
involves the potential for such a wide range of results, courts have often required
that the benefit be "direct." 8 It is questionable whether this requirement has
helped, however, since courts also vary considerably in their interpretation of the
term "direct." 9
Financing institutions are hesitant to accept an upstream guaranty because
of the lack of judicial uniformity in the field and the corresponding uncertainty
surrounding the enforceability of such guaranties. This obviously hampers the
effectiveness of an otherwise useful tool. In order to make this financing technique more acceptable to creditors and therefore more available for corporate
use, a greater degree of predictability must be achieved. Consistent, uniform
judicial treatment of "upstream" guaranties could promote upstream financing
while still protecting creditors and minority stockholders. Financing institutions
could then accept these guaranties with a reasonable expectation that they would
be upheld. This would obviously promote a more efficient use of the resources
of affiliated corporations.
In order to propose an appropriate judicial response to upstream guaranties,
the effect of both corporate guaranty law and fiduciary duty law must be considered. Moreover, many state statutes are applicable, and the effect of these
statutes on the common law must also be analyzed. Once these areas have been
analyzed individually, it will then be possible to consider how the courts might
combine them to achieve a uniform standard by which to judge upstream
financing transactions.
II. The Corporate Guaranty
A. The Common Law
Whenever a corporation guaranties a note as an accommodation," there is
a strong possibility that the guaranty will be voidable as ultra vires. When sustaining this defense the courts emphasize the fact that the plaintiff knew that
7 See text accompanying note 13 infra.
8 See, e.g., Davis v. Old Colony R.R., 131 Mass. 258 (1881); Kreidmann, The Corporate
Guaranty, 13 VAND. L. Rav. 229, 232 (1959).
9 See text accompanying note 15 infra.
10 For a complete discussion of the corporate guaranty, see Kreidmann, supra note 8.
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the guarantor was receiving none of the funds and that the guaranty was solely
to accommodate the borrower."
Courts vary in their methods of determining when these guaranties will be
enforced. In the absence of statutes, 2 an empowering provision in the guarantor's corporate charter will often be sought. If there is no such provision,
many courts are reluctant to find an implied power. However, other courts
recognize such a power and will enforce the guaranty if the "transaction can
reasonably be said to be incidental to the conduct of the business authorized by
the charter."'"
The key to the decisions appears to be in identifying a "benefit" to the
guarantor corporation. In addition to express and implied power to execute
guaranties, most courts require that the guarantor corporation "directly benefit"
from the transaction. The determination of whether a benefit is direct or indirect appears to be the major problem underlying corporate guaranty law.
Direct benefit is an intangible concept which may be viewed quite differently by different courts, especially since the question is one of degree. Strictly
speaking, it would seem that direct benefits would include only such things as a
sale, a future sale, or the assured re-payment of a loan that was previously
questionable. However, varying corporate situations arise involving "grey" areas
as to which reasonable persons could differ in deciding whether the benefit is
direct or indirect.' 4 Indeed, cases exist in which courts faced with substantially
identical facts have reached opposite conclusions.1 5
An additional problem involves the fact that some courts, while actually
seeking a benefit, employ different wording in framing their tests. An example
of this is the use of the "reasonably incidental to the conduct of business"
standard. On first impression this test appears to be different from the direct
benefit test. Anything "incidental to the conduct of business" would benefit the
corporation, but the wording of the test does not call for such a strict interpretation of benefit as the "direct" benefit test purports to do. Using this "incidental
to the conduct of business" test, courts have allowed a brewing corporation to
become a surety on a liquor bond for a saloon keeper,' 6 a corporation to become
a guarantor of a valuable employee's payment for furniture,' and a corporation
to guaranty a customer's debt to another to allow the debtor to stay in business. 8
The results in these cases could have been the same, however, even if the
court had applied the "direct" benefit test due to the wide variance in dell Id. at 231. See also Foster v. Merkle-Korff Gear Co., 233 Ill.App. 302 (1924);
Farmers' & Traders' Bank v. Thixton, Millett & Co., 199 Ky. 69, 250 S.W. 504 (1923).
12 See text accompanying note 26 infra.
13 See Kreidmann, supra note 8, at 231; see also Credit Co. v. Howe Machine Co., 54
Conn. 357, 8 A. 472 (1886); Central Trust Co. v. Smurr & Kamen Mach. Co., 191 Ill. App.
613 (1915); Monument Nat'l Bank v. Globe Works, 101 Mass. 57 (1869).
14 See Kreidmann, supra note 8, at 233, for a discussion of which benefits have been held
to be direct or indirect in the past.
15 See Kreidmann, supra note 8, at 233; see also Central Lumber Co. v. Kelter, 201 Ill.
503, 66 N.E. 543 (1903); W. C. Bowman Lumber Co. v. Pierson, 110 Tex. 543, 221 S.W.
930 (1920).
16 Horst v. Lewis, 71 Neb. 365, 98 N.W. 1046 (1904).
17 M. Burg & Sons v. Twin City Four Wheel Drive Co., 140 Minn. 101, 167 N.W. 300
(1918).
18 A. M. Castle & Co. v. Public Service Underwriters, 198 Wash. 576, 89 P.2d 506 (1939).
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terminations of what constitutes "direct." Due to this variance, the two tests
appear to be so similar that uniform wording would produce substantially the
same results while making the law much easier to follow and apply.
To further complicate the matter, a court's view of what constitutes a
direct benefit may vary depending on who is suing. If the intra vires creditors
or the stockholders are suing, the transaction is more likely to be considered
ultra vires since the courts are more protective of these parties than they are of
the corporation when the party seeking to enforce the guaranty is the plaintiff. 9
It appears that the courts are often seeking to reach what is perceived as a "fair"
result, and as a consequence the bases for the decision of what is direct or indirect
vary; they frequently appear tailored to support the results which the courts seek
to attain.20
If the court cannot fit the transaction into an allowable category, there is at
least one alternative to declaring the guaranty unenforceable as ultra vires. When
the equities are clearly with the lending party, yet the transaction appears to have
been ultra vires, the court may apply the doctrine of estoppel if the guarantor
corporation has accepted some benefits.2 ' The justification for applying this
doctrine is that the corporation should not seek to retain benefits and reject
burdens.
The use of the estoppel doctrine still involves a benefit analysis, but benefits need not be direct. For example, in McCornick & Co. v. Citizen's Bank,22 the
bank guarantied its customer's drafts. The bank was later estopped from setting
up a defense of ultra vires, since it had benefited from securing and holding the
banking business of a good customer. 3
If the creditor had knowledge of the potential unenforceability of the
guaranty, however, a court may refuse to apply estoppel or may even refuse to
24
apply the usual benefit analysis. In Win. Filene's Sons Co. v. Gilchrist Co.,
the subsidiary corporation guarantied a lease of the parent corporation. The
parent corporation defaulted on the lease and the lessor attempted to enforce the
guaranty. The lessor-plaintiff argued that the benefit test was satisfied since the
subsidiary benefited by having a non-competitive store in that location. Before
execution of the guaranty, however, the lessor had been aware that the guaranty
might be ultra vires if a benefit was not found. The court decided that the
guaranty was being used to the personal advantage of the majority stockholder
and refused to consider any equitable principles since the creditor had been
aware of the potential problem.2"

19 See Kreidmann, supra note 8 at 235; see also In re Gilchrist Co., 278 F. 235 (D. Mass.
1922); In re Prospect Worsted Mills, 126 F. 1011 (D. Mass. 1904).
20 Id. at 236.
21 See Kreidmann, supra note 8, at 234; see also Eddleman v. Wofford, 217 S.W. 221
(Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
22 304 Mo. 270, 263 S.W. 152 (1924).
23 304 Mo. 270, 291, 263 S.W. 152, 158 (1924).
24 284 F. 664 (1st Cir. 1922).
25 This problem may be resolved by a statute that follows the Model Act, 1 MODEL BusINESS CORPORATION ACT [MBCA] § 7 (1974). See text accompanying note 33 infra.
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B. Statutory Change
All of the foregoing tests have been developed through the common law.
Recently, however, many states have enacted statutes that alter these traditional
approaches dramatically. For example, one type of statute prohibits guaranties
except by a vote of two-thirds of the shares of all classes of stock.' This can be
an advantage to financing institutions and corporations seeking to convince the
institutions to accept the guaranty, because no benefit, direct or incidental, need
be shown. However, this type of provision can be impractical in all but the
smallest corporations since attempting to secure approval from a large group of
stockholders is costly and impractical.
Other statutes have more directly expanded the power to guaranty. An
important example of this type of statute is the Model Business CorporationAct,
which simply states:
Each corporation shall have power:
(h) To make contracts and guarantees and incur liabilities, borrow money
at such rates of interest as the corporation may determine, issue its
notes, bonds, and other obligations, and secure any of its obligations by
mortgage
or pledge of all or any of its property, franchises, and
27
income.

Another example is a Georgia statute, which allows a corporation "to make
any purely accommodation guaranty, indorsement, or contract of suretyship" if
its charter so provides.28 Similarly, a North Carolina statute gives a corporation
the power "[t]o enter into contracts of guaranty or suretyship or make other
financial arrangements for the benefit of its personnel or customers or suppliers." This statute is of limited utility in upstream financing situations, however, since another North Carolina statute simultaneously requires stockholder
approval for issuance of a corporate guaranty of the indebtedness of a related
corporation."0
Although these statutes expand corporate guaranty powers, interpretations
of the statutes vary. Some courts may still require a direct benefit, regardless of
the statute, while other courts will not inquire into benefit at all." This variation in approach is readily apparent in interpretations of corporate charter
authorization clauses. Some courts will adamantly require a direct benefit in
addition to an empowering provision in the charter, whereas other courts will
require no benefit at all when such a provision is present."
26

See

CAL. [CORP.] CODE

§ 823 (West, 1976).

27 1 MBCA § 4(h) (1974). This section has been adopted identically or identically in
substance in Hawaii, Indiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming. Comparable statutes have been enacted in Alabama, Alaska,
Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. For other
provisions, see MBCA.
28 GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1828 (Supp. 1966).
29 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-17(b) (3) (Supp. 1959).
30 N.C.GEN. STAT. § 55-22 (Supp. 1961).
31 See Kreidmann, supra note 8, at 241.
32 Id. See, e.g., Talmadge v. Clewiston Iron Co., 252 Ill. App. 508 (1929); Thomas v.
E. G. Curtis Sons Co., 7 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Mich. 1934).
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Many recent statutes follow another provision of the Model Act and abolish
the defense of ultra vires except in a few situations.3" This type of statute precludes the use of the defense by the corporation when the financing institution
attempts to enforce the guaranty. It provides that no act shall be invalid by
reason of lack of capacity or power unless the claim is asserted by a) a shareholder to enjoin the doing of the act; b) the corporation or its representatives
against the officers or directors; or c) the Attorney General to enjoin the act or
to dissolve the corporation. "4
This statute makes it much less important for the creditor to inquire into
the power of the corporation to guaranty or to predict whether the guarantor
corporation will benefit from the transaction. " As discussed previously, the
major problem in seeking to enforce an upstream guaranty is the lack of a
recognizable benefit to the subsidiary. Since this is true, creditors are reluctant
to accept this type of financing. With the abolishment of this defense as to
creditors, the prospect of finding lenders willing to finance under such an arrangement improves.
Even in a state which adopts the Model Act, however, the possibility of
stockholder intervention exists. The Model Act'" provides that stockholders may
enjoin any act by claiming that the act is beyond the power of the corporation.
A Texas case, Inter-Continental Corporation v. Moody, involved a statute
substantially the same as this Model Act provision. In Inter-Continental,Moody
procured funds from a financing institution to loan to the corporation. These
loans were used to purchase investments which were allegedly for the benefit of
the president. The corporation, Inter-Continental, entered into a contract which
provided for a fee to be paid to Moody for procuring the loans. During the trial
for collection of the fee, the evidence tended to show that the loans were for the
personal benefit of the president, and since there was no direct benefit to the
corporation, the contract was actually ultra vires. Since Texas had abolished
the ultra vires defense, however, Inter-Continental could not assert it. To overcome this difficulty, Inter-Continental found a stockholder who was willing to
intervene. An interlocutory appeal was taken to determine if this was allowable.
The appellate court held that intervention was proper and it instructed the
lower court to enjoin payment to Moody if the loans were found to be for the
personal benefit of the president.' "
Even in those states which restrict the ultra vires defense, financing institutions contemplating acceptance of an upstream guaranty must therefore con33 1 MBCA § 7 (1974).
34 Identical provisions have been enacted in Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota,
Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Identical in substance are Alaska, Illinois, and
Maryland. Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Louisiana, New York, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and the District of Columbia have
comparable provisions. See 1 MBCA § 7, ff 3.03 (1974).
35 See Empire Steel Co. v. Omni Steel, 378 S.W.2d 905. (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), where
the Texas statute is applied to preclude the assertion of the defense of ultra vires. See also
Cooper Petroleum Co. v. LaGloria Oil & Gas Co., 423 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
36 1 MBCA § 4(h) '(1974).
37 411 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
38 Jd. at 591.
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sider the possibility of stockholder intervention." Although the Model Act does
provide for possible damages when a corporate act is enjoined, the lender should
consider whether this protection would be adequate should resort to the courts be
necessary.
C. Application to Upstream Financing
Recent case law and statutory change illustrate the trend toward enforcement of guaranties. This has been accomplished in the common law by a "generous interpretation" of the direct benefit test.4" As previously noted, 4 the use
of the direct benefit and similar tests has allowed enforcement of guaranties on
employees' debts and customers' debts, as well as many other transactions that
can hardly be said to directly benefit the corporation. 2 Although companies
cannot always depend on such a generous interpretation of benefit, the trend
appears to be in this direction. This development is important even in states with
liberal guaranty statutes, since even though the statute may allow a guaranty,
courts may still look for some benefit or furtherance of the corporate purpose."'
Finally, legislative expansion of the power to guaranty and the abolition of the
ultra vires defense shows that the legislatures, as well as the courts, intend to
promote enforcement of guaranties.
This expansive trend in the general field of corporate guaranty law obviously affects upstream guaranties. Whereas a subsidiary may not be "directly"
benefited by a venture in which the parent has become involved and which the
subsidiary has guarantied, in many situations it is obviously to the subsidiary's
benefit to have a profitable parent. The subsidiary is often dependent on the
parent for various needs;44 advertising, publicity, finances," and supplies are but
a few of the possible advantages the subsidiary may receive. These benefits
should be considered by the court as sufficient to meet the "direct" benefit test if
the courts are to carry out the liberal intent of the statutory provisions relating
to the enforcement of guaranties generally.
In Stromberg-CarlsonT. Mfg. Co. v. George C. Beckwith Co.,"0 this type
of benefit was accepted by the court as sufficient to uphold a guaranty. Although
the case involved a guaranty between brother-sister corporations, the situation is
analogous to upstream guaranties. The president of the guarantor corporation
owned "most of the stock" of the guarantor corporation and all of the stock of
an unrelated corporation. The first corporation guarantied the debt of the latter
and the court upheld the guaranty. The court said that the defendant guarantor
39 The majority stockholders who planned the transaction may want to solicit a minority
stockholder to do the intervening in order to prevent the guaranty from being enforced.
Often this includes paying his expenses.
40 Kreidmann, supra note 8, at 234. Courts do not always expand what benefits a corporation. See Humboldt Min. Co. v. American Manuf'g, Mining, and Milling Co., 62 F. 356 (6th
Cir. 1894); Bowman Lumber Co. v. Pierson, 110 Tex. 543, 221 S.W. 930 (1920).
41 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
42 See note 14 supra.
43 See note 31 supra.
44 See, e.g., Erwen v. Peoria & E. Ry. Co., 78 F. Supp. 312, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
45 Although the subsidiary is financing the parent now, in other situations, past or future,
the parent may help finance the subsidiary.
46 193 Minn. 255, 258 N.W. 314 (1935).
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corporation had interests to protect in securing credit for the debtor. The guarantor corporation had a strong interest in the debtor corporation continuing in
business and meeting the previous obligations which the guarantor corporation
had incurred in the debtor's behalf.
This is directly analogous to the situation in which a subsidiary has loaned
the parent money in the past. The court in Stromberg-Carlson enforced the
guaranty, paying particular attention to the property interest involved. In the
words of the court:
While a corporation cannot become a surety on obligations in which it has
no interest, it may guarantee the obligations of its subsidiary companies;
and this doctrine has been extended to permit it to guarantee the obligations
of others where the purpose is to promote or protect its own rights or property interests, or to accomplish some legitimate object of financial benefit
to it . . .47

This rationale makes it relatively simple to uphold downstream financing
without inquiring into previous interfinancing due to the parent's stock interest
in the subsidiary. Finding a property interest of the subsidiary in the parent is
more difficult. However, a property interest seems to include previous loans and
could conceivably include other "rights" which the subsidiary wishes to protect,
such as the right to help the parent continue in business, which would be a
legitimate financial benefit to the subsidiary. Of course this has not yet become
a majority rule, nor even a "trend in the law," and therefore it cannot be
heavily relied on in planning a similar transaction.
III. Minority Interests: The Fiduciary Duty Doctrine
A. Tests
The law involving minority interests is as unsettled as corporate guaranty
law.4" The basic problem underlying this area is that majority stockholders,
including parent corporations, have the potential to exert their power for
personal reasons, to the detriment of the minority. To avoid such abuses, a
fiduciary duty is held to exist when the majority stockholders become involved
in the management of the business.4 9 In a parent-subsidiary context, this means
that the parent, if involved in the affairs of the subsidiary, owes a fiduciary duty
to the subsidiary's minority stockholders.
Various tests have been used to determine when the fiduciary duty has been
violated. The most frequently used test examines a transaction as if the parties
were independent to determine whether the parties would have entered into
47

Id. at 315. Accord In re Duncan & Goodell Co., 15 F. Supp..550 (D. Mass. 1936),

where the court allowed a downstream guaranty to protect the interest of the corporation
in the subsidiary.

48 For a complete discussion, see Comment, Corporate FiduciaryDoctrine in the Context
of Parent-SubsidiaryRelations, 74 YALE L. J. 338 (1964).
49 For a more thorough discussion, see Comment, The Corporate Fiduciary Duty Doctrine and the Requirement of Fairness in Parent-Subsidiary Relations, 76 DicK. L. Rav. 237
(1972).
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this transaction had there not been this relationship. This analysis involves
basic contract bargaining principles, such as arms-length dealing and consideration. If these factors are present, it is assumed that the parties would have made
the decision in the same way regardless of the identity of the other party."
Often the test of good faith is substituted for, or used in conjunction with,
the "arms-length" test. This entails inquiry into whether the majority stockholders who controlled the transaction acted in good faith, with the corporation's
interests in mind, and not to carry out personal objectives. Of course, "good
faith" is quite a subjective concept which is difficult to define in a particular
51

case.

The business judgment rule and the intrinsic fairness test are two alternative
approaches commonly applied to evaluate the fairness of parent-subsidiary transactions.52 Of these alternative approaches, the intrinsic fairness test has been the
one most often utilized in the past. When the intrinsic fairness test is applied,
the burden is on the defendants to show that the transaction was made in good
faith and in the best interests of the subsidiary; the presumption is against the
parent.
For example, in Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc.,53 the stockholders of the
parent challenged the use of the goodwill of the name of the parent by the
subsidiary. Since a majority of the directors who controlled the transaction were
not disinterested in it, the court said that it was not required to accept the business judgment of the directors. The court stated:
When directors are thus interested in and obligated to both transferor and
transferee, a court of equity is not obligated to accept the directors' judgment, but may and, indeed, should require them to54 prove to the court's
satisfaction that the [transaction] has been equitable.
The business judgment rule, on the other hand, simply asks whether the
management has made a sound business decision and requires the plaintiff to
prove "gross and palpable over-reaching" in order to overturn the managers'
decision. 5 The presumption here is in favor of the parent. This rule tends to
disregard the minority's interests for the sake of non-interference with management decisions.56
In a recent Delaware case, Sinclair Oil Corporation v. Levien" the court
expanded the scope of the business judgment rule in cases involving parents and
subsidiaries by limiting the applicability of the intrinsic fairness test to situations
50 See note 48 supra, at 339; see, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939);
Geddes v. Anaconda Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 599 (1921).
51 Id. at 342-43.
52 See Walde, Parent-SubsidiaryRelations in the Integrated Corporate System: A Comparison.of American and German Law, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 455, 470 (1974).

53 313 F.2d 472 (3d Cir. 1963). See also Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch.
20, 89 A.2d 862 (1943).
54 Id. at 479.
55 See Walde, supra note 52, at 470; see also Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, 221
A.2d 487 (1966); Levien v. Sinclair Oil Corporation, 261 A.2d 911 (Del. Ch. 1969), modified, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
56 Id. at 477.
57 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
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marked by self-dealing. In general, self-dealing "relates to transactions wherein
a trustee, acting for himself and also as trustee, a relation which demands strict
fidelity to others, seeks to consummate a deal wherein self-interest is opposed to
duty.""8 When applying "self-dealing" to parent-subsidiary affairs, the Levien
court interpreted the term somewhat differently: "[s]elf-dealing occurs when the
parent, by virtue of its domination of the subsidiary, causes the subsidiary to act
in such a way that the parent receives something from the subsidiary to thd
exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority stockholders of the subsidiary." 9
In this case, Sinclair Oil Corporation held 97% of the stock of Sinclair
Venezuelan Oil Company (Sinven). The board of directors of Sinven was
comprised of directors nominated by Sinclair. Since these directors were not
independent, they owed a fiduciary duty to the minority stockholders of Sinven.
In this derivative action, Sinven's minority stockholders argued that Sinven
had paid excessive dividends due to Sinclair's need for cash. The minority
interest also contended that the intrinsic fairness test should be applied and that
the burden of showing fairness was therefore on the parent. The court decided
that this transaction did not involve self-dealing since a portion of the money
was received by the minority stockholders; the majority received nothing that
the minority did not receive. Since self-dealing was not involved the business
judgment rule became the applicable test and the court let the managers' decision stand."0
A similar approach, recently adopted by a New York court in Case v. New
York Central Railroad Company,6 applies the advantage/disadvantage test to
determine whether to apply the business judgment rule or to delve more deeply
into questions of fairness. When this test is applied, the plaintiff must show advantage to the parent and disadvantage to the subsidiary or the court will not
examine the fairness of the transaction.
Case involved an allocation of tax benefits due to offsets of gains and
losses between the parent and the subsidiary. The allocation gave some benefits
to the subsidiary, but most of the benefits flowed to the parent. Since the subsidiary lost no money, the court refused to examine the fairness of the transaction, stating, "in the absence of this kind of disparity [ad.vantage/disadvantage]
the business judgment of corporate officers will not be interfered with."6 2
The rationale for the disparity requirement seems to be that if no one has been
hurt, the courts will look no further. Such a view, however, ignores the fact that
perhaps the subsidiary should have benefited and did not. Also, when the subsidiary has been put to a disadvantage but the parent has not benefited (possibly due to a bad bargain), courts adopting this test would not investigate the
transaction.
58 First Nat. Bank of Birmingham v. Basham, 238 Ala. 500, 505, 191 So. 873, 876 (1939).
59 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
60 Another example of a situation in which self-dealing has been held not to be present is
when a third party has some control over the transaction, or sets the terms of the bargain.
See Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 255 A.2d 717 (Del. Oh. 1969). See aso Meyerson v.
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 246 A.2d 789 (Del. Ch. 1967), where the business judgment rule
is applied.
61 256 N.Y.S.2d 607, 204 N.E.2d 643 (1965).
62 Id. at 611, 204 N.E.2d at 646.
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B. CorporateOpportunity Doctrine
In addition to the factors examined above, corporations utilizing upstream
financing must consider the diversion of corporate opportunity doctrine.63 This
doctrine is applicable when an opportunity comes before an individual who owes
a fiduciary duty to a corporation. If the opportunity is one that the corporation
can and should use, the individual cannot usurp the corporation's opportunity
to do so. The doctrine is important in the context of fiduciary duty of the
parent to the subsidiary, since the subsidiary's assets are being used to finance
a business venture. Thus, the question arises as to whether the subsidiary should
also be entitled to the benefits of the venture.
This is not necessarily the situation presented in upstream financing, however, for various reasons. First, the subsidiary corporation may not be in the
same line of business as the parent, and to envision the subsidiary taking the
opportunity would be unrealistic from a business point of view. Second, the
subsidiary may be supplying only a portion of the financing; the guaranty may
simply be additional security to secure a commitment from a bank.
In Maxwell v. Northwest Industries, Inc.,64 for example, Northwest Industries (NWI) was a conglomerate which owned 97% of the stock of Philadephia
& Reading Corp. (P&R), a subsidiary with an unrelated line of business. NWI
desired to acquire another subsidiary and borrowed a significant amount of the
money from P&R. After NWI had purchased a certain amount of stock, it
decided not to complete the acquisition and sold at a substantial profit the stock
which it had purchased. P&R's minority stockholders argued that this was a
diversion of P&R's opportunity, and that P&R should receive the profit from
the sale. The court held that the opportunity was not P&R's because P&R did
not have the requisite amount of public securities to meet the terms of the
exchange offer, had restrictions in a loan agreement limiting the issuance of new
debt securities (which would have been necessary to effect the entire purchase),
and had "adopted" a corporate policy not to become involved in this type of
transaction. The court also noted that the parties intended all along that the
transaction would be that of NWI, and that if there had been a loss, the entire
loss would have been that of NWI.65
It seems, then, that when considering whether a certain opportunity may
fall within the scope of the corporate opportunity doctrine, it is important to ascertain the economic interests and objectives of the corporations. A recent
article66 suggested that in any inquiry into a possible diversion of corporate opportunity, "[T]he scope of the fiduciary's duty will be determined by the ex63 See Walde, supra note 52, at 481. See also Westerly Theatre Operating Co. v. Pouzzner, 162 F.2d 821 (1st Cir. 1947); Lutherland, Inc. v. Dahlen, 357 Pa. 143, 53 A.2d 143
(1947); Loft., Inc. v. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. 138, 2 A.2d 225 (1938); Johnston v. Greene, 35
Del. 479, 121 A.2d 919 (1956).

When the corporations use loans for upstream financing, potential diversion of assets
below stated capital must also be considered. See Sears v. Weissman, 6 Ill. App. 3d 827, 286
N.E.2d 777 (1972), for an illustration of the problem.
64 339 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1972).
65 See also Meuller v. Mac Ban, 132 Cal. Rptr. 222, 62 Cal. App. 3d 258 (1976), where
the intrinsic fairness test is applied in the diversion of corporate opportunity context.
66

See note 52 supra.
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pectations of the corporation and by its need to conduct its business adequately.
There must be some close association between the opportunity and the prospective activities and interests of the corporation.""7
Corporate officers must review all of the preceding problems and tests when
considering upstream financing. Unlike the situation in which the parent controls 100% of the subsidiary, when minority stockholders own part of a subsidiary, the corporations considering upstream financing must consider more than
statutory allowance of guaranties and the related benefit analyses. The parent
must make certain that the transaction is fair to the subsidiary, and cannot
proceed in complete disregard of the subsidiary's interests. In addition, corporate
officers must determine that the subsidiary could not have used the opportunity
as well as the parent.
C. Upstream Financing-A Progressive Approach
Since the intrinsic fairness test has been the test most frequently utilized in
the past in parent-subsidiary transactions," this is the test that business managers
must plan to encounter if their transaction is tested in court. However, recent
progressive approaches to these problems have been adopted by some courts and
may be the trend in the future. Hayman v. Morris9 gives some insight into the
manner in which some courts may treat upstream financing when stockholders
are suing. The court in this case approached a problem involving upstream loans
and guaranties in a stockholder derivative suit in a unique, business-oriented
manner. The parent (IFC) was a holding company. IFC invested in second
preferred stock of its subsidiary (IAG), including a call agreement which allowed
IFO at its option to redeem its investment for cash by retiring the stock. IFC
later borrowed from IAC and also secured guaranties from IAC of certain IFC
obligations. When the loans were made, restrictions were put on the call agreement so that the stock could not be called except as to sums in excess of the
outstanding loans.
The subsidiary subsequently discontinued business due to poor business conditions. In this derivative action, the minority stockholders argued that when the
loan agreement was made, it purported to allow redemption of second preferred
stock in excess of the loan. They contended that the agreement was therefore
ultra vires, since there was a possibility when the loan was made that there
would not be funds available for the first preferred holders. Payment to the
second preferred holders would not be legal in these circumstances.
After business difficulties were encountered, IFC lowered the interest rate
on the loans below what it had previously been. The stockholders alleged that
this was also ultra vires as an abuse of power.
The court applied the business judgment rule to these problems, holding
that the loans were not ultra vires. According to the court:

67
68
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Id. at 482.
See text accompanying note 52 supra.
46 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1943).
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The loans made ... would seem within the proper scope of business judgment by the directors of IAC under all the circumstances particularly in
view of the relations between IFC and IAG, the joint
corporate problem,
70
and the so-called "moral duty" on AC to assist IFG.
This case is a rather broad interpretation of the business judgment rule.
The court viewed the transactions from the standpoint of the managers as joint
corporate managers and did not consider what result an independent bargainer
would have reached. The court left untouched the managers' decisions as to
how to handle corporate transactions as a group. Few courts have been so
willing to accept similar transactions without looking more deeply into questions
71
of fairness.
IV. Solving the Problem of Legal Uncertainty in Upstream Financing
A. Blending guaranty and fiduciary duty law: A feasible solution
Currently, business managers and financing institutions must consider all
of the preceding aspects of the law when deciding to use upstream financing.
To alleviate this task and to promote the use of upstream financing, courts should
arrive at a rational combination of these tests to use when considering an upstream financing problem. Although such a combination of tests-may not be the
best solution to the problems involved in upstream financing it appears to be
the most feasible method that one could suggest to the courts or legislatures as a
uniform solution to the problem. Although other and perhaps better solutions
72
amounting to more radical departures from current law will be discused below,
a workable solution can be achieved by blending certain aspects of corporate
guaranty and fiduciary duty law.
The effect of recent changes in guaranty law has been to make creditors
more willing to accept the guaranty. When minority stockholders' interests are
involved as well, courts should continue to promote this method of financing
while still protecting the minority. When courts have attempted to do this,
however, they have failed to apply any particular test with consistency,73 and
this lack of consistency has impaired the effectiveness of upstream financing.
The basic test for the validity of a corporate guaranty in the absence of
particular statutes"4 (and often even at times when statutes are applicable) is
an inquiry into whether there is some benefit to the corporation or, as this has
been applied by some courts, whether the guaranty is incidental to the conduct
of the business." The most common tests used to determine whether a fiduciary
duty to a minority interest has been violated are "intrinsic fairness" or "business
70 Id. at 489.
71 In dicta, the court considered as valid IFG's argument that IAO owed IFC a "duty"
to make funds available. Id. at 490.
72 See text accompanying note 85 infra.
73 Hayman v. Morris, 46 N.Y.S.2d 482 is a good example of this. See also Gotshal v.
Mill Factors Corp., 289 F. 1005 (2d Cir. 1923).
74- As previously noted, even when a statute is directly applicable, courts may look for a
benefit. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
75 See text accompanying note 10 supra.
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judgment.""0 In order to solve the problem of uncertainty that now exists in the
law, the best corporate guaranty tests and fiduciary duty tests should be combined
in a consistent manner.
In order to accomplish this, two similar tests can be substituted to govern
all cases involving upstream guaranties. The first test would be applied in most
instances and would involve a merging of business judgment (fiduciary duty
law) and benefit (guaranty law). The second test would only be applicable
when the court felt a stricter test should be applied, particularly when "selfdealing" was involved. This test would merge intrinsic fairness and benefit.
Under this streamlined inquiry, whenever a court finds a benefit or furtherance of corporate purpose, it should also find that the business judgment test
has been met. This is because corporate officers using sound business judgment
will act in furtherance of a corporate purpose, thus benefiting the company.
Therefore, if a court can find some benefit or some corporate purpose served by
the transaction, the assumption should be that the corporate managers used sound
business judgment, since the presumption is in favor of the parent.
The inquiry into benefit under this test should not require the subsidiary to
receive most of the benefits, but merely require the parent not to ignore the
subsidiary's interests. A California case comes very close to applying this rationale. In Woods Lumber Co. v. Moore,7 the court combined the business judgment rule with an implied power test which essentially amounted to an inquiry
into benefit:
The question whether or not a contract of guaranty comes within the
reasons above mentioned [implied powers] is one which is to be primarily
"determined by the corporation, or those to whom the management of its
affairs is intrusted" . . . The court cannot determine that it is beyond the
powers of the corporation, unless it clearly appears to be so as a matter of
law . . .managers "are not limited in law to the use of such means as are
usual or necessary to the objects contemplated by their organization, but,
where not restricted by law, may choose such means as are convenient and
adapted to the end... 1
When the court feels compelled to impose a stricter test, particularly due to
self-dealing, the second test would be applied. As a part of this, the courts can
require a more direct benefit to show that the interests of the subsidiary have
been considered.
By combining the tests in this manner, the court can choose one of two
tests to apply in an upstream financing situation. 9 The benefit-business judgment test should be chosen unless self-dealing is involved or the court feels it is
appropriate to apply a stricter test in particular instances. In any event the
focus will be on benefit; an indirect benefit will be necessary for the first test and
a more direct benefit will be necessary for the stricter test.
Of course potential problems still exist due to the uncertainty reflected in
76
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See text accompanying note 48 supra.
Woods Lumber Co. v. Moore, 83 Cal. 497, 191 P. 905 (1920).
Id. at 907.

79 These tests should also be applied to wholly-owned subsidiaries as a way of protecting
intra vires creditors.

[Vol. 53:840]

NOTES

the decisions concerning what constitutes a "direct" benefit. Nevertheless, use
of this approach should require the court to isolate the upstream financing
transaction from any other corporate problems and to specify which of the two
tests is being applied. Because of this, case law should develop as to which benefits
will be accepted under each test, thus giving some direction for future transactions.
B. Application of the law to hypothetical situations
In order more thoroughly to analyze the potential uses of upstream financing
and to determine how the courts will probably treat various problems, it is
useful to consider some hypothetical situations. Current law will be applied to
each hypothetical, followed by an application of the proposed combined tests.
# 1) The parent is a service company. A wholly-owned subsidiaryis created
and all real property is transferredto it. Some time after this is done, the parent
needs to borrow money. Having few assets to use as collateral,the parent uses the
subsidiary to guaranty the loan.
This problem is one of the easiest to solve, since it involves a wholly-owned
subsidiary."0 Minority interests do not come into play, so intrinsic fairness or
even business judgment need not be considered. In the absence of a statute, and,
indeed, often when a statute is present, benefit or furtherance of corporate purpose must be found. In this hypothetical, the subsidiary derives its income from
the parent as rent and has a strong interest in the parent's profitability. This
situation would be analogous to Stromberg-Carlson,s' a case in which the corporation had an interest in the related corporation staying in business to meet past
obligations. In Case # 1, the guarantor subsidiary has a strong interest in the
parent staying in business in order for the subsidiary to survive; the subsidiary's
profitability depends on the continued existence of the parent.
Also of great significance to 100%-owned subsidiaries are the statutes which
preclude the use of the defense of ultra vires. If no minority stockholders are
involved, even if the guaranty is without benefit to the subsidiary, the only people
who can complain are the attorney general or a representative of the corporation.
If corporate assets are not actually being diverted, and fraud is not involved, the
guaranty will probably be enforceable.
Application of the proposed combined test would result in the use of the
least restrictive test, since the subsidiary is wholly-owned and minority interest
problems need not be considered. Therefore, only some indirect benefit must be
found since the presumption is in favor of validity. Since the subsidiary is dependent on the parent for rent, benefit is present and the guaranty would be
valid and enforceable.
#2) The parent is a holding company with two unrelated subsidiaries.The
parent owns 100% of Subsidiary #2 and 90% of Subsidiary #1. Subsidiary #1
is a capital-intensive manufacturer.Subsidiary #2 is a retailer with most of its
80 Some state statutes specifically allow downstream financing of wholly-owned subsidiaries.
This authorization may extend to cross-stream and upstream financing if the ownership is
100%. See Art. 1302-2.06 (B), TMCLA; see also note 4, supra at 908.
81 See text accompanying note 46 supra.
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assets consisting of inventory. Subsidiary #2 has an opportunity to expand its
line but the banks will not accept inventory as collateral.Subsidiary #1's equipment is free from mortgages or liens and the bank will accept Subsidiary #1's
guaranty on a loan to Subsidiary #2.
This is a typical cross-stream financing situation involving a guaranty and
minority interests. It is directly analogous to an upstream financing situation in
which the parent's line of business is unrelated to that of the subsidiary. Since
intrinsic fairness has been the test most heavily relied on by most states in the
past for parent-subsidiary dealings, this strict test should be assumed for analysis
purposes as far as fiduciary duty law is concerned. Even Delaware, which has
restricted the intrinsic fairness test to transactions involving self-dealing, may
still apply this test in a situation similar to Case #2.
Whereas the situation
involved here does not involve a specific transaction in which one controlling
corporation reaps benefits to the exclusion of the other, the potentiality for this
state of affairs is present. Therefore, even a court applying this rule may find
self-dealing and apply the intrinsic fairness test.
According to the test, corporate managers or financing institutions seeking
to uphold a guaranty must prove good faith in order to meet the fairness burden.
As one recent comment emphasized, however, "the concept of good faith has
been employed in the case-law of parent-subsidiary disputes chiefly as a makeweight to reinforce the court's disapproval of defendant's objectives .
,.82
Therefore, if the directors keep the subsidiary's interests in mind, it would seem
that the courts will not disapprove and will hold that good faith was present.
To satisfy guaranty law tests, direct benefit must also be shown. Since the
only benefits Subsidiary # 1 will gain in the hypothetical situation are the intangible benefits of being part of the group, it might be advisable to arrange a
profit-sharing contract"s to assure Subsidiary # 1 of some of the potential benefits of Subsidiary #2's expansion. Another alternative to consider, either separately or in conjunction with this contract, is stockholder approval, if it is
feasible.84
The use of the proposed test would simplify this process. The court would
choose the strict test and seek a direct benefit. None appears to be present here,
and in the absence of a profit-sharing contract, stockholder approval, or other
statutory device, the guaranty would be struck down.
V. Seeking the Best Solution
Commentators have suggested many solutions to the problems raised by
corporate guaranties and contracts involving minority interests. These will be
briefly considered in order to determine their potential impact on upstream
financing. As previously noted, these solutions may not be as practically applicable as the proposed combination of guaranty and fiduciary duty law; however,
they should be considered as potential future solutions.
82
83
84

See note 48, supra at 343.
See text accompanying note 94 infra.
See text accompanying note 26 supra.
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One recent 5 proposal"8 would give a corporation the statutory power to
make a guaranty for any person or corporation if the guarantor can reasonably
expect to benefit directly or indirectly. A decision by the board of directors
would be binding. Stockholders could bring suit prior to the execution of the
guaranty contract and claim that there would be no benefit. After execution
of the guaranty, the stockholder's only recourse would be against the directors.
This type of statute would obviously simplify upstream guaranty law. Even
though there might still be some question as to the definition of benefit, the
decision would have to be made in advance. This proposal would give creditors
more protection, since after the guaranty contract is formed minority stockholders could only assert their claims against directors.
Another commentator"7 suggests using an "expectation" test. The expectation test defines fairness in terms of the expectations of the stockholders at the
time they enter into the relationship. In upstream financing this would essentially mean that the minority stockholders should understand that, if necessary,
the corporation will use the subsidiary to finance the parent's operations. The
validity of this test, however, would depend on how stockholders acquired their
stock. If it were acquired through an outright purchase, the test would be
reliable, since the purchaser would have known he was purchasing an interest
in a controlled corporation. Often minority interests are created through consolidations, however, and a stockholder becomes involved in a situation which
he did not contemplate at the time he purchased the stock. Due to these problems, the use of this suggestion as a means of solving upstream financing problems
is questionable at best.
Another commentator"8 suggests a "contractually-supported investment"
as a means of avoiding use of the corporate guaranty. Basically, the use of this
device in an upstream financing context contemplates an outside financing
institution loaning money to the parent to enable it to produce some type of
goods or services. The financing institution, however, will not rely on the parent's
credit and seeks the extra protection of a guaranty from the subsidiary. Instead
of a guaranty, a non-cancellable contract is entered into between the parent
and the subsidiary whereby the subsidiary promises to purchase the goods that
are produced by the parent to the extent of the loan payments. Since this is a
noncancellable contract, the subsidiary must pay for the goods whether produced

or not." The financing institution is assured in this way that the parent will have
ample funds to pay back the loan. The creditor relies on the non-cancellable
contract as a third-party beneficiary and a guaranty is avoided. It is unclear
how a court will view the contractually-supported investment, since it is a new
85

See note 4 supra.

86 This proposal concerns a recent Texas statute.
87 See note 48 supra.
88 Dwyer, A Legal and Business Examination of the Contractually Supported Investment in Relation to the Corporate Guaranty, 23 SYRAcusE L. REv. 33 (1972).
89 The subsidiary becomes a conduit for the sales up to the amount of the loan payments;
if there is a loss, the subsidiary pays to the extent of the loan. If there is a profit, it belongs
to the parent since goods in excess of the loan amount are not part of the contract. This may
cause the transaction to be viewed as a sham since the subsidiary is a mere conduit. In order
for this type of contract to work, it would seem that the subsidiary must either have a need
for the goods or receive part of the profits of a successful venture.
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development and has not been tested. It has been suggested, however, that the
courts could view this as an "informal guaranty" and invalidate it.9" If this tool
is accepted by the courts, in many situations the possibility of using the contractually supported investment should be considered by corporate officers as a
feasible alternative to an upstream guaranty.
The recommendation that affiliated corporations be viewed as a unit in
proper circumstances appears to be the most viable solution to the upstream
financing problem.91 "Proper circumstances" would encompass any situation
in which business managers treat the corporations as a unit for any purpose.
As one author writes:
The more the subsidiary is integrated into the economic unit the less its
interest-a yardstick to define the fairness-is easy to define. Its well-being
depends to some unmeasurable degree on the group's well-being.

...

92

When business managers treat the corporations as a unit, so should the courts.
This would be accomplished by denying corporations the opportunity to claim
limited liability due to separate legal status when attempting to avoid the responsibility of the guaranty. Any tests devised, however, should protect minority
interests from gross abuse or "gross and palpable overreaching."'" The closest
that courts have come to doing this is by the use of the business judgment test
in fiduciary duty law. Since this test views corporations as they are viewed by
corporate managers, expansion of situations in which this test is applied furthers
the goal of "treating corporations as a unit."
Although American jurisdictions have not widely accepted the theory which
views affiliated corporations as a "unit," German law does adopt the concept. A
German statute94 allows affiliated corporations to form a "domination contract."
A "domination contract" allows the parent to allocate opportunities and financing in any fashion that it feels will benefit the group as a unit. The German
law allows parents and subsidiaries to choose between forming a domination
contract or being treated under previous laws (comparable to United States
laws) with additional reporting requirements.
In order to form a domination contract, there must be at least 50% control
by the parent and centralized management. Any action taken under the contract must benefit the group. The minority is protected in unique ways; any
losses incurred by the subsidiary are reimbursed by the parent, the group must
adopt a compensation scheme (profit contract), the domination and profit contracts must be approved by three-fourths of the stockholders, and the subsidiary
must maintain adequate capital reserves.99
90 See Dwyer, supra note 88, at 43. The court may invalidate this as to the creditor as an
informal guaranty; it may also invalidate the contract since there is a possibility that the subsidiary would be paying for something it does not receive.
91 See note 48 supra.
92 See note 52 supra, at 473.
93 See text accompanying note 55 infra.
94 The German KONZERNRECHT, [1965] BGBL I 1089. For a complete discussion, see
Bringezu, Parent-SubsidiaryRelations Under German Law, 7 INT'L LAW. 138 (1973). For an
excellent comparison and analysis of American and German parent-subsidiary law, see Walde,
note 52 supra.
95 See note 52 supra, for a more complete discussion of minority duties and protection
under the German Law.
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The prime advantage of this statute is that it gives legal recognition to an
integrated corporate system." The interests of the corporate group are optimized.
It is apparent how a similar statute would eliminate many upstream financing
problems. Once a corporation elected to form a domination contract, the previously discussed tests would be unnecessary. An upstream guaranty would be
allowed and the domination contract would provide the method of allocating
profits and losses.
If corporations did not elect domination contracts, strict rules should apply,
completely disallowing these inter-corporate transactions. The tests previously
devised would therefore not be necessary whether there was a domination contract or not. This type of statute is preferable to the current law because it is
more uniform; the various tests are no longer necessary and therefore predictability is promoted. Inter-company financing is promoted while giving protection
to companies which do not wish to be involved in inter-company transactions.
Passage of a statute similar to the German model may not be readily acceptable in the United States since the separate entity structure is fairly well engrained in corporate law. However, statutes could be proposed in the United
States which would still follow the basic "theme" of viewing affiliated corporations as a unit when appropriate. A statute allowing upstream/cross-stream
guaranties with provisions for compensation would serve this purpose.
The economic unit concept has not been ignored by some courts in this
country, as previously seen in Hayman r. Morris,"' in which the court treated
problems arising in parent-subsidiary affairs as joint corporate problems. In
Aeronca, Inc. v. Style-Craters, Inc.,"s the court refused to inquire into an intercompany account when asked to do so by a third party. The court said the rule
of close scrutiny did not apply to ordinary business transactions as long as the
rights of others were not involved. In other words, the court let the businesses
operate as a unit as much as possible.
A similar attitude was demonstrated in Cleary v. Higley,9 9 in which a transaction occurred whereby the subsidiary was "forced" by the parent to sell its
stock. The transaction took place pursuant to a reorganization plan; the corporations had current liabilities in excess of current assets and receivership proceedings were pending. Therefore, quick action was necessary. The court said that
"forcing" the subsidiary to sell its stock was "necessary" in the circumstances.
The New York court did not require the parent to prove fairness in every
transaction and required four circumstances to be present in order to shift the
burden of proving fairness to the directors:' 00 1) loss to the subsidiary; 2)
undue profit made by the parent at the expense of the subsidiary; 3) acts committed to secure or promote a selfish parental interest.; and 4) a fraud on the
part of the interested directors in carrying out the challenged transaction.
96 The problem with the German law is that when a domination contract is not elected,
the same problems that occur in the United States are still present. To cure this, in the absence of a domination contract, these inter-company transactions should be disallowed.
97 46 N.Y.S.2d 482.
98 546 F.2d 1094 (4th Gir. 1976).
99 154 Misc. 158, 277 N.Y.S. 63 (1934).
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This test relies very heavily on business judgment. The court will refuse to
examine the fairness of a transaction unless the preceding criteria are met. The
Cleary court noted that this test gives the parties the substance of their bargain.
Furthermore, it comports with reality by treating the corporations as a unit.
As the court said in Cleary:
Commercial transactions are common between subsidiary and parent corporations, where the stockholders of one may be different from the stockholders of the other. Indeed, it is often one of the very reasons for the
creation of subsidiary corporations, that arrangements mutually advantageous to both may be entered into between the two corporations. Such
transactions are usually fair to both corporations. Indeed, the presumption
is that the directors of 1a 1 corporation act fairly and honestly rather than
unfairly and dishonestly.
The same attitude was exhibited, although to a lesser extent, in Gotshal v.
Mill Factors Corporation.' In that case three companies were controlled by
the same stockholder and operated as a unit. An agreement was made jointly
by them with a factor, authorizing both the transfer of amounts from one company's account to the other and the use of merchandise as collateral for advances
to the others. This method of financing benefited all of the corporations by
reducing factor commissions and inducing the factor company to make loans in
disregard [of] corporate entity in favor of business unity. ...."'
The agreement was held to be incidental to the conduct of business and
therefore not ultra vires, since advantages of the agreement flowed to each corporation. Since the agreement contemplated "disregard of entity" when formed,
holding the corporation to the terms of the agreement did not equate to holding
one corporation liable for the debts of another.
VI. Conclusion
The two fields of law that are generally applied when considering the
validity of an upstream guaranty, fiduciary duty law and corporate guaranty
law, have been the subject of recent common law expansion and statutory
change. This change has been in the direction of a more liberal interpretation
of corporate powers and toward enforcement of guaranties. Of course, this
makes the use of upstream guaranties much more feasible than in the past. However, upstream guaranties have received little judicial attention and the field is
far from achieving desired predictability. Therefore, it is advisable that before
corporations enter into such a transaction, the officers or corporate counsel carefully analyze the various aspects of the contemplated arrangement. This analysis
should include an ascertainment of the types of benefits accruing to all involved
parties, as well as an examination of the effect of the transaction on minority
interests.
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Ideally, legislation could be enacted which would give corporations the
opportunity to be treated as a unit. In the meantime, however, greater certainty
is needed in both corporate guaranty law and fiduciary duty law in order to
better predict judicial response to upstream financing and thereby make the use
of the guaranty more acceptable to financing institutions. In the absence of
structural change, the two-pronged approach suggested in this note would
simplify the process of determining in advance the applicable standard for judging a guaranty. This simplicity would lend predictability and order to this field
of the law.
Janette Aalbregtse
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